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M
y views about the Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA) surely differ from those 
of many of the other individuals who will 
contribute to this volume. I believe that, 
despite the good intentions and worthwhile goals of the 
CRA’s advocates, the CRA is an inappropriate instrument 
for achieving those goals.1
Fundamentally, the CRA is a regulatory effort to “lean 
on” banks and savings institutions, in vague and subjec-
tive ways to make loans and investments that (the CRA’s 
proponents believe) those depository institutions2 would 
otherwise not make. It is a continued effort to preserve 
old structures in the face of a modernizing financial 
economy. At base, the CRA is an anachronistic and 
protectionist effort to force artificially a local focus for 
finance in an increasingly competitive, increasingly elec-
tronic, and ever-widening realm of financial services. 
Further, ironically, the burdens of the CRA may well dis-
courage banks from setting up new locations in low-in-
come neighborhoods and thus providing local residents 
with better-priced alternatives to high-cost check-cashing 
and payday lending establishments.
There is a better way. First, to the extent that lend-
ing problems can be traced to discrimination against 
racial or ethnic groups or involving other categories of 
personal discrimination, the right tool is more vigorous 
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws—notably, the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974.
Second, vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, 
especially with respect to mergers, is necessary to keep 
financial markets competitive, so that banks and other 
lenders are constantly under competitive pressure to 
provide attractive services offerings to their customers. 
If, for some reason, enforcement of the antitrust laws is 
deemed not sufficient in this respect, then policymak-
ers should open entry into the business of banking to 
companies who have a business model of providing 
good value to low- and moderate-income households. 
Consistent with this focus, vigorous competition by any 
lender should not be permitted to veer off into preda-
tory practices, in which aggressive sales personnel take 
advantage of unsophisticated customers who are insuf-
ficiently aware of better alternatives.
Third, to the extent that there are socially worthwhile 
lending opportunities that somehow are not being satis-
fied by existing lending institutions, these projects should 
be funded through the public fisc, in an on-budget and 
transparent process. The Community Development 
Financial Institutions Fund, authorized by the Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement 
Act of 1994 and managed by the U.S. Treasury, is a good 
example of this kind of public funding mechanism. To 
the extent that its current funding levels are inadequate, 
they should be increased.
Finally, if public policy persists with something that 
resembles the CRA, the annual local lending obligations 
of banks should be explicitly quantified. These obliga-
tions could then be traded among banks, so that a system 
could arise that is similar to the “cap and trade” system 
that has proved so successful for dealing with sulfur diox-
ide emissions in a low-cost and efficient manner.3
I will not try to summarize the CRA or the extensive 
literature on it in this brief article. I have written about 
the CRA in the past.4 Recent comprehensive reviews of 
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the CRA can be found in Apgar and Duda (2003),5 Barr 
(2005),6 and Bernanke (2007),7 and a recent symposium 
on the CRA can be found in the Western New England 
Law Review 29, no. 1 (2006). The remainder of this 
article will expand on these ideas.
The Drawbacks of the CRA
Consider the basic concept of the CRA: Banks are 
somehow neglecting loan opportunities in the com-
munities in which they have establishments—primarily 
in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities—and 
must be forced to lend in those communities. Another 
version of this argument is that a bank that gathers 
deposits from customers that are located geographi-
cally close to that bank’s physical location is “draining” 
deposits out of the community when it lends those funds 
elsewhere.
At its base, this concept rests on the notion either 
that: (a) banks are lazy (or ill-intentioned) and are inef-
ficiently passing up profitable opportunities to lend to 
creditworthy customers in LMI communities, and so 
they must be forced to do so; or (b) they are monopolies 
with market power and excess profits that can be used 
to cross-subsidize the unprofitable loans in the LMI 
community that they can be forced to make. Either ver-
sion has the flavor of the pre-1970s world of banks and 
banking, where competition was not especially vigorous 
and state and national regulations often impeded entry 
and prevented banks from branching outside their home 
communities, which thereby often created pockets of 
local market power.
Further, the notions that banks have special obliga-
tions toward “their” communities and that the communi-
ties need and deserve this protection again smack of that 
pre-1970s world of localized finance.
Let us instead consider lending in the context of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century. In that context, 
there are at least five bases for questioning the wisdom 
of the CRA. First, if loans are profitable, profit-seeking 
banks should already be making them. In this case, the 
CRA is redundant at best (but it is still costly because of 
the costs of compliance and of regulatory monitoring). 
Of course, banks make mistakes and may not be the 
perfect maximizers of introductory economics textbooks. 
But the CRA is based on the notion that banks systemati-
cally overlook profitable opportunities in LMI communi-
ties. And that seems unlikely in today’s environment.
Alternatively, there may be spillover effects that cause 
single loans to be unprofitable but that would cause a 
group of loans to be profitable. In that case, we should 
expect to see banks forming joint ventures or other types 
of coalitions to “internalize” the externality and make 
these profitable loans.
On the other hand, if the loans are not profitable, 
then: (a) they require a cross-subsidy from the excess 
profits from other (super-profitable) activities of the bank; 
but in the increasingly competitive environment of finan-
cial services, there will be little or no excess profits; or 
(b) they will involve losses for the bank; or (c) they will 
be shirked and avoided, with accompanying cynicism. 
Neither of these last two prospects should be the basis 
for good public policy.
Second, why should a bank have a special obligation 
to lend to a specific local geographic area? What is spe-
cial about local geographic areas or about the specific 
placement of physical bank locations? Should the bank 
also have an obligation to hire only employees who live 
in that same geographic area? Must it buy its desks from 
local merchants?
The localism orientation of the CRA is an anachro-
nism that runs counter to the broad sweep of public 
policy in the financial services area, which has been to 
erase protectionist measures (such as restrictions on in-
trastate and interstate branching and the forced compart-
mentalization of financial services) and to place more 
trust in competition.
Further, the “draining deposits” notion ignores the 
substantial value to an LMI community of a bank that of-
fers primarily deposit services and a few related services 
(such as check-cashing, cash transfer, and perhaps some 
personal loans). To the extent that community leaders 
are concerned that the community’s citizens are using 
higher-cost alternatives, such as check-cashing offices 
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and payday lenders, they should welcome banks, even if 
the banks provide a limited menu of services. Ironically, 
the lending obligations of the CRA (and the extra burden 
of exiting an area if the operations there turn out to be 
unprofitable) may well discourage the establishment of 
branches in LMI areas in the first place. Barriers to exit 
are barriers to entry.
Third, why place this special obligation on banks? 
After all, there are many other categories of lenders for 
most of the types of loans that banks make. Are banks 
special? If so, in what ways are they special, and are 
those ways relevant for CRA purposes?
Banks are special in at least two important ways: (a) 
they (along with credit unions) provide federally insured 
deposits, which is an important benefit for financially 
unsophisticated customers who seek a safe place for 
their transactions accounts and for simple savings; 
deposit insurance also provides stability for the overall 
banking system by forestalling the kinds of depositor 
runs on banks that plagued American banking before 
1933 (and that Britain revisited in September 2007 with 
its Northern Rock debacle);8 and (b) commercial banks 
especially are important sources of credit for small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
Both special features are good arguments for vigorous 
antitrust enforcement, to ensure that bank mergers do 
not create anticompetitive environments in local markets 
for deposits and for SME lending. Neither provides an 
argument for imposing CRA requirements to make loans 
that they otherwise would not be inclined to make.
Fourth, in a dynamic setting, banks’ choices of loca-
tions will surely be influenced by the regulatory burdens 
that accompany those choices. As noted above, to the 
extent that they consider decisions to locate in LMI areas 
as carrying extra regulatory burdens (and as involving 
greater difficulties of exit in the event that the location 
proves to be unprofitable), they are less likely to locate 
in those areas in the first place.
Fifth, the vagueness of the CRA’s language—that 
banks should meet “the credit needs of its entire 
community, including low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods”—has led to vague and subjective 
enforcement. Initially, enforcement focused on a bank’s 
efforts toward serving its community and the documen-
tation of those efforts; after 1995, enforcement focused 
more on documenting lending outcomes; in essence, 
pre-1995 regulation focused on inputs, while post-1995 
regulation focused more on outputs. Although the latter 
is surely an improvement over the former, nevertheless 
the inherent vagueness of “needs” inevitably leads to the 
vagueness and subjectivity of enforcement. This cannot 
be the basis of good public policy.
In sum, the CRA is fundamentally at odds with the 
modern sweep of public policy with respect to financial 
regulation and with the reasons and arguments that un-
derlie the direction that policy has taken. It emphasizes 
protectionism and localism and distrusts competition in 
an era when the sweep of policy is to reduce and elimi-
nate local barriers and to rely more on competition than 
on forced lending. And by discouraging entry in LMI 
areas, the CRA may well be contrary to the long-term 
interests of the communities that it is intended to help.
There have recently been broader critiques of the 
CRA: that it encouraged banks to make subprime mort-
gage loans (which were then securitized) and thus the 
CRA bears major responsibility for the housing bubble of 
1999–2006, and then for the mortgage-related securities 
crisis that began in 2007.
I believe that these broader critiques are badly aimed. 
It appears that the bulk of the subprime lending of 
the earlier years of this decade was made by nonbank 
lenders—that is, by “mortgage banks” that either securi-
tized the mortgages themselves or that quickly sold the 
mortgages to securitizers. These nonbank lenders were 
not covered by CRA requirements. Further, the major 
financial difficulties that were related to investments in 
these mortgage securities were experienced mostly by 
investment banks (such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Broth-
ers, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch) and by a large 
insurance conglomerate (AIG)—none of which was 
covered by the CRA. Where banks did experience dif-
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as CitiBank, WaMu, Wachovia (having absorbed Golden 
West in 2006), IndyMac, and Countrywide, it appears 
that they were heavily involved in subprime lending 
because of its perceived profitability (and their underap-
preciation of the risks) and not because of CRA pressures.
The CRA has multiple flaws, but responsibility for the 
subprime mortgage lending and securities debacle does 
not appear to be one of them.
Better Public Policies
These criticisms of the CRA should not be interpreted 
to mean that no governmental actions are warranted. As 
I stated at the beginning, there is a better way to achieve 
the goals of the CRA’s advocates.
First, discrimination by lenders of any kind with 
respect to racial or ethnic or other prohibited categories 
should be vigorously prosecuted under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and any other available statute, such as 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Second, the antitrust laws should be vigorously en-
forced, so as to keep financial markets competitive.
Third, if enforcement of the antitrust laws is deemed 
inadequate for encouraging sufficient competition in 
banking, then policymakers should allow entry into the 
business of banking by more companies, including those 
that have a business model of providing value to LMI 
households. It is indeed ironic that the same community 
groups that advocate for more banking services for LMI 
households were also those who lobbied the FDIC and 
the Congress during 2005–2007 (in alliance with the 
banking lobbyists, with whom the community groups 
are at odds with respect to efforts to expand the CRA’s 
burdens on banks) to thwart Wal-Mart’s efforts to enter 
the banking business by obtaining an industrial loan 
company charter from the state of Utah.
Instead, Wal-Mart and other retailing and industrial 
companies should be encouraged to enter banking 
preferably through a modification of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1970 or (as a last resort) through the 
granting of FDIC insurance to the otherwise qualified 
holders of Utah industrial loan company charters.9 The 
potential problems for the safety and soundness of banks 
that would be posed by such companies’ ownership of 
banks would be no more serious than the problems that 
are caused by current ownership structures, and they can 
be handled by the same regulatory tools that are cur-
rently used.10
Fourth, to the extent that there is a good social case 
for local lending and investment that local lenders 
somehow do not satisfy, those loans and investments 
should be funded through the public fisc, in an on-
budget and transparent process. The Community Devel-
opment Financial Institutions Fund is a good example 
and it should be expanded to replace whatever socially 
worthwhile projects would be eliminated if the CRA 
were repealed.
Finally, if the CRA remains in force, its vague and 
subjective regulatory enforcement should be replaced by 
a set of specific annual lending obligations that would 
encompass both originations and portfolio holdings. 
These obligations would then be tradable among banks. 
Those banks that were less efficient at originating and 
holding these types of loans could pay other banks that 
were more efficient at these activities to take over these 
obligations. This system, in addition to making more 
transparent the obligations that are often opaque, could 
achieve the kinds of efficiencies that have attracted 
attention to the “cap and trade” system for controlling 
sulfur dioxide emissions by U.S. electric utilities. 
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